Abstract In this paper, I pursue the question whether extending democratic rights to work is good in the broadest possible sense of that term: good for workers, firms, market economies, and democratic states. The argument makes two assumptions in a broadly consequentialist framework. First, the configuration of any relationship among persons in which there is less rather than more coercion makes individuals better off. Second, extending democratic rights to work will entail costs and benefits to both the power and authority (...) of employers and meaningful work for employees. These costs and benefits cannot be determined in advance because they are largely empirical, but there are still good reasons for expanding worker participation all-things-considered. First, I examine the parallel case for extending democratic rights to the workplace based on several similarities between politics and work organization. In addition, I consider the objections from voluntariness and efficiency. Although both objections raise interesting problems I believe that a properly formulated conception of democratic workplaces can answer them. In the final section, I sketch a minimal conception of these rights at the level of the firm that does not require a large-scale transformation of the market economy. (shrink)

I argue that there is nothing in Kant’s moral theory that legitimates condemnation of same-sex relations and that the arguments from natural ends Kant relies on in doing so are unjustified by the constraints placed upon morality to avoid the empirical determination of judgments. In order to make clear why same-sex activity does not contradict the requirements of the moral law, we need to understand Kant’s account of legitimate sexual activity. I provide this reconstruction in the first section, drawing upon (...) the Lectures on Ethics and Metaphysics of Morals. In the second section, I critique the first kind of argument that grounds Kant’s assessment, that from natural ends. I show how it is based upon underlying teleological premises and raise doubts concerning Kant’s reliance on “regulative ideas” in making a consistent ethical theory. In the third section, I argue that same-sex activity that conforms to the conditions of the moral law, especially given the concepts of consent and reciprocity, are in conformity with Kant’s formal requirement of the law of pure practical reason, and therefore cannot justifiably be condemned on those grounds. Finally, I conclude with some discussion about Rawls and political liberalism. I hope to show how the present Kantian revival in ethical theory can place itself in opposition to the conservative and homophobic hysteria surrounding debates on political and legal issues such as same-sex “marriage.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Ethics is receiving increased emphasis in civil and environmental engineering. However, despite the proliferation of college textbooks and courses encouraging ethical reasoning, engineers in practice often limit their understanding narrowly to their individual actions. Broader issues of global importance are usually addressed in an ad-hoc manner, if at all. Our goal is to present the topic of ethics in a way that appeals to engineers, especially those receptive to ‘systems thinking’. Our broader motivation is to encourage the development of (...) educated, virtuous and caring professionals who engage in contextual ethical reasoning about complex systems. To these ends, we summarise relevant theoretical and applied concepts for ethical analysis, building from a recent chapter that reflects on ethics from an engineering systems perspective (but applied to the healthcare industry). We emphasise virtue ethics and the ethics of care as crucial supplements to duty ethics and utilitarianism. Analytical methods we discuss include Value Sensitive Design, Design for Care, and a multi-level classification of ethical issues into the micro (individual), meso (institutional), and macro (societal) levels. This work collects relevant considerations for designers of civil and environmental engineering systems and researchers interested in developing related design and analysis methods that include practical ethical reasoning. (shrink)

Income inequality in democratic societies with market economies is sizable and growing. One reason for this growth can be traced to unequal forms of compensation that employers pay workers. Democratic societies have tackled this problem by enforcing a wage standard that all workers are paid regardless of education, skills, or contribution. This raises a novel question: Should there be equal pay for all workers? To answer it, we need to investigate some factors that are relevant to the unequal conditions of (...) power and authority in which wage offers are made. By clarifying these, we can determine whether wage inequality is morally permissible. If not, then a case might be made to pay all workers the same regardless of education, skills, or contribution. Even if it is permissible, another question worth considering is whether there are limits to how much inequality is acceptable. The argument here proceeds along the following lines. First, I summarize the economic and non-economic factors that determine the value of wages in labor markets. Second, I examine a particular problem that concerns whether the conditions of wage labor are coercive because they restrict alternatives or otherwise include threats to the welfare of workers. If there is coercion, we have good reasons to establish a standard that improve these conditions. Finally, I claim that establishing this standard requires increasing the value of low-wage work. Doing so will not only expand alternatives that are available to these workers, it will also diminish the potential threat to their welfare. (shrink)

Recent technological developments in automation threaten to eliminate the jobs of millions of workers in the near future, raising worrisome questions about how to satisfy their welfare. One proposal for addressing this issue is to provide all citizens with a “universal basic income” (UBI) that ensures everyone with a social minimum. The aim is to give all individuals an unrestricted cash grant that provides them with an income that does not depend on status, wealth, or employment. The question this paper (...) explores is whether UBI can replace work in the age of automation. Work has financial and non-pecuniary benefits that provide individuals with an income, as well as self-realization, self-respect, and community. While the provision of UBI will supplement the financial benefits of work, the question remains whether such a grant can replace these non-pecuniary benefits. The first section outlines the benefits and burdens of work. The second section considers the effects of technology on work in the context of automation. The third section examines the arguments for UBI that make it a philosophically attractive alternative to traditional welfare policies. Finally, the last section evaluates whether the benefits of UBI can replace the loss of work in terms of its non-pecuniary benefits. (shrink)

We claim the climate crisis is the proper baseline for establishing the terms of debate about the viability of a post-work future. In this paper, we aim to assess the viability of a post-work future in which automation replaces a significant portion of human labor. We do this by laying out the possible outcomes of what such a future will look like based on three related axes: technological capacity, politics and social distribution, and alternative conceptions of the good. The purpose (...) in tracking these outcomes is to have a clear picture of those outcomes we should be pursuing in contrast to those we ought to avoid. Put another way, to achieve a post-work future that is egalitarian in character will require ensuring that technological capacity is used to improve the prospects for all humanity. The argument proceeds along the following lines. First, we summarize the scientific consensus about the causes and consequences of climate change, as well as the tools of mitigation and adaptation it recommends. The causes are primarily rooted in the global system of production and consumption that has developed over the last century. We refer to this pattern of development as the “Growth Model” since it primarily relies on energy created from burning fossil fuels and the exponential consumption of resources to promote more growth (Rose 2020). Second, we construct a range of possible outcomes regarding the climate crisis that are based on different trajectories of development. We do so by examining each of two cases located on the poles of three different axes. These axes include technology, political organization and social distribution, and conceptions of the good, yielding eight possible outcomes. The point of considering these cases and how they intersect along these axes is two-fold: to clarify the features that define them and compare their merits and drawbacks, enabling us to formulate the means for avoiding some outcomes and strive for others. Third, we then consider the viability of a post-work future in terms of these outcomes. Some of these outcomes point in a direction where automation replaces labor, and its benefits are shared widely. Others indicate a future in which some groups benefit at the expense of others, while some appear to preclude the emergence of such a future altogether. Finally, we conclude with some observations about the viability of a post-work future given our evaluation of these outcomes. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Foucault’s conception of agency by reconstructing two complementary approaches he takes: the ‘analytics of power’, which examines the relation between norms and practice by charting the institutional development within which a set of norms emerge, and the concept of ‘problematization’, which examines reason-giving practices, or varieties of normative justification that legitimize rational institutions and agents’ participation in them. Contrary to the standard caricature, Foucault’s analysis of the relation between norms and institutions does not merely reduce (...) the former to relations of ‘power’. In short, he also thinks standards of justification are just as revisable as social practices themselves, and the focus here will be on the relation and importance of these two complementary approaches to his critique of normativity. Key Words: agency • critique • Foucault • normativity • social practice. (shrink)

The present paper motivates one possible answer to Kant’s question, “What remains of the Enlightenment?” by reinterpreting the relation between Foucault and critical tradition from Kant to the Frankfurt School. The Enlightenment has left us with “normative superstition,” or a healthy form of skepticism about the justification of modern institutions and ideals. Along these lines, I adopt an interpretation of Foucault that diverges from the standard view. I argue that he shares with his detractors a common heritage of this “critical (...) attitude,” placing him squarely in line with Kant, Hegel, and critical theory generally. If it is possible to view this critical attitude as an expression of Enlightenment-oriented views, then there are reasons to believe that his so-called “postmodernism” is nothing more than hyper-modernism. The lines of this last argument have been made elsewhere, notably in Robert Pippin’s important work, but there is a need to situate Foucault in the unfolding narrative of modernity, rather than label him a hostile opponent to it. In my view, the “Foucault addiction” now so popular is consistent with the critical tradition and the aim of this paper is to develop this claim. (shrink)

Growing economic inequality, workforce precarity, the perceived meaninglessness of many jobs, and the prospect of widespread technological unemployment have led to an unprecedented level of critical scrutiny of the institution of work. Some scholars go so far as to propose that we should take seriously, or even embrace, a “post-work” future. This volume aims to provide the first critical overview of the scholarly arguments about the design and desirability of such a “post-work” world. Topics addressed in its chapters include the (...) historical origins of the work ethic; work’s relation to freedom, leisure, and self-realization; alternative visions of a post-work world; the intersection of post-work thinking with economic justice; and post-work’s relevance to environmental sustainability, care work, and democratic change. (shrink)

The book is intended for use in professional ethics, engineering ethics, environmental studies, computer sciences, and technology studies. Our rationale for developing it is two-fold. First, to create an excellent and accessible textbook for students at all levels of learning. Second, to include recent developments in ethics on topics such as gender, race and inequality, while providing updated case studies of interest to students, teachers, and professionals in these areas. The approach that we take is committed to a pluralist and (...) interdisciplinary framework, guided by considerations of equity and inclusion. Our goal is to facilitate learning by taking a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to relevant issues that encompass ethical theory, applied ethical reasoning, and the professional dimensions of engineering with a particular focus on sustainability and technology. (shrink)

This piece outlines an argument against recent changes in U.S. immigration policy that aim to give priority in admissions to skilled workers rather than family members seeking unification. I argue that democratic states have a moral obligation to admit individuals seeking unification with family members, rather than give priority to skilled workers.

Guided by Hegel’s claim that rights are actualized only in the ethical life of the modern state, and that the “abstract spirit of Kant’s cosmopolitanism” is pervasive in Carol Gould’s Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights, Schaff raises a variety of moral, political, and ontological objections to her account of rights. He argues that if we embrace with Gould the idea that people have rights in abstraction, in political communities where they are not practically realized, we unwittingly play into the hands (...) of imperialism cloaked in human rights language—as exemplified by the rhetoric justifying recent U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. (shrink)